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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Respondent and Appellee Pine Meadow Ranch Home Owners Association (the
"Association") agrees with the statement of jurisdiction contained in the brief filed by
Plaintiff and Appellant Paul Howard Peters ("Peters").

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
Issue No. 1: Whether Peters has standing to challenge the Pine Meadow Ranch, Inc.
("PMRI") CC&Rs and the 1980 Lien Notice, since he took title to Lot 6D, subject to, and
with notice of, these recorded instruments?
Issue No. 2: Whether Peters has overcome the presumptions contained in Utah Code
Ann. § 57-4a-4, i.e., that PMRI was an owner of the property that became Lot 6D and this
entitled to execute and record the CC&Rs?
Issue No. 3: Whether Utah has adopted the Doctrine of Uniformity, and, if so,
whether that doctrine is satisfied since it applies equally to all 85 lots in the Pine Meadow
Ranch Plat D Subdivision?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because this matter is before the Court of Appeals on appeal from entry of Summary
Judgment by the district court on each of the above issues presented, the Court of Appeals
grants the district court's legal conclusions no deference, reviewing them for correctness.
Arnold Industries, Inc. v. Love, 63 P.3d 721,725 (Utah 2002) (citations omitted).
1

PRESERVATION OF ISSUES IN THE TRIAL COURT
Issue No. 1: See R. 0246-49.
Issue No. 2: See R. 0249-53.
Issue No. 3: SeeR. 0436.

DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS
Issue No. 1: Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-102 (2000); Utah Code Ann. § 57-4a-2 (2000);
Swenson v. Erickson, 998 P.2d 807 (Utah 2000); 20 Am. Jur. 2D
Covenants §§ 266-67 (1995); Ault v. Holden, 44 P.3d 781 (Utah 2002).
Issue No. 2: Utah Code Ann. § 57-4a-4 (2000); Jacobs v. Hafen, 875 P.2d 559 (Utah
App. 1994); Capital Assets Financial Services v. Maxwell, 994 P.2d
201 (Utah 2000); TWN, Inc., v. Michel, 66 P.3d 1031 (Utah App. 2003);
Flying Diamond Oil Corporation v. Newton Sheep Company, 116 P.2d
618 (Utah 1989).
Issue No. 3: 20 Am. Jur. 2D Covenants § 160 (1995).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1
Appellant Peters filed this expensive lawsuit in an effort to avoid annual assessments
of $ 175 levied under the thirty-year-old Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for the Pine
Meadow Subdivisions ("CC&Rs") recorded in Summit County in 1973. Specifically, this
appeal seeks to reverse the summary judgment entered by the Hon. Judge Bruce C. Lubeck

1

The Association does not agree with Peters's Statement of the Case,
Appellant's Brief ("App. Br.") at 10-18, in part because Peters failed to separately set forth
a statement of facts as required by Rule 24(a)(7) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Therefore, the Association sets forth its own Statement of the Case and Statement of Facts
in accordance with Rule 24(b)(1).
2

effectively validating the CC&Rs. (R. 0479-83). Peters, the owner of Lot 6D in the Pine
Meadow Subdivision, Plat D ("Lot 6D"), recognizes that Pine Meadow Ranch, Inc. recorded
the CC&Rs in 1973 against a large tract of real property in Summit County, Utah. (R. 022130). Peters tries now to avoid his obligations despite the fact that he took title to Lot 6D with
notice of the decades-old PMRI CC&Rs.2
The Association operates as the homeowners' association for approximately 800 lots,
homes and cabins in the Pine Meadow Ranch and Forest Meadow Ranch Subdivisions
located north of Silver Creek Junction in Summit County. (R. 0259). Principal access to the
Pine Meadow Ranch area, and Peters's Lot 6D, is from Silver Creek Canyon between Silver
Creek Junction and Wanship along Interstate 80, reached from Tollgate Canyon. The ranch
area is to the north and west of Interstate 80. The lots in the Pine Meadow Ranch and Forest
Meadow Ranch subdivisions are adjacent to each other and they share a common roadway,
water system and homeowners' association. (R. 0259).
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, an individual named Brent Jensen and his several
companies, including PMRI, acquired interests in and began development of a large parcel

2

The Association respectfully suggests that the Court may consider this a
frivolous appeal under Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure since Peters
acquired title to his lot with subject to, and with notice of, the PMRI CC&Rs, and because
the expensive approach Peters has taken in this litigation is wholly out of proportion to the
amount of controversy at issue, i.e., a $175 annual assessment.
3

of real property that would become the various Pine Meadow Ranch and Forest M e a d o w
Ranch subdivisions.
Legal title to the development land was initially held by Security Title Company as
Trustee for certain then-unidentified interests. As is typical in real estate development, the
land was then developed in phases. Security Title later identified and confirmed the parties
Inn vUh mini M \ i u ' i s l i i | i in i lir mi I '.Is k i d ili iil'U'ii! w i n in il f n i m il v i l l i v n r l i >| llli i s c pi I S O I I S o r
entities in signing and recording the plats for the various subdivisions. Peters ignores this
practical and logical process.

as self-described " o w n e r s / ' recorded a plat, Pine M e a d o w Ranch Plat D, subdividing what
is n o w known, as part of the Pine M e a d o w Ranch subdivision. (R. 0204). Prior to t h e
recording of the subdivision plat, In /!\ ugust 19 73,, PI\ if! 11 lad i ecorded, at the request of SS,;i
Rivni Jensen, a set of C C & R s which encumbered portions of the Pine Meadow Ranch area
including, specifically, the land that became the lot owned now by Peters. (R 0221-30).
In May iK) *. . me 1 orest Meadow Ranch Landowners Association, which had acted
^ »^<-.

it uli • ' — J t s.1 M e a d o w R :

l

- f '*• ^ -

-

l

m\h

the Association. (R. 0259). In 1980, to confirm public notice of the various sets of CC&Rs
recorded against the various Pine Meadow and Forest Meadow subdivisions, the Association

See Leo M. Bertanole, Inc. v. Pine Meadow Ranches, 639 P.2d211,212 (Utah
1981) (noting a general description of the development area and Brent Jensen's involvement
in the development).
4

republished those CC&Rs in the form of a "Notice of Lien" ("1980 Lien Notice"). (R. 026162). The 1980 Lien Notice did not purport to change or alter any of the referenced the
CC&Rs (including the PMRI CC&Rs), it merely clarified the applicability of the CC&Rs to
the various Forest Meadow and Pine Meadow areas that were, post-merger, served by the
Association. Id.
For many years, the Pine Meadow and Forest Meadow subdivisions were served by
a Special Service District established by Summit County (R. 0260). The District taxed the
lots and used that money to maintain the roads and water system, among other things. During
this time, the Association had continued to act on behalf of its members in the Forest
Meadow Ranch and Pine Meadow Ranch areas. The Special Service District was dissolved
by Summit County in 1999. Most of its assets and obligations (including the maintenance
and insurance of a large network of roads) were conveyed to the Association. In 2003, the
Association had an annual budget of approximately $140,000. (R. 261). The source of this
budget is the modest $175 annual assessment on the property owners in the area subject to
various CC&Rs.4 The subdivision plats and the CC&Rs recorded against the 800 separate
properties within the Association have been the foundation of hundreds, if not thousands, of
deeds and other conveyances over the years since their creation and recording. (R. 0259-60).

4

While the CC&Rs vary somewhat throughout the subdivisions within the
Association, the level of assessment is absolutely uniform for all lots. The Association began
making direct assessments to its members when Summit County dissolved the Special
Service District. (R. 0260-61).
5

I")i I inn m Mi')1', Peters ac<.|iiin d i (ml 'hDopiesslv u [ i |iili|<'d ImMsejnrnls. * nn.Mumts
restrictions, rights of way and reservations appearing of record and, taxes for the year 1999,
and each year thereafter." (R. 215). Compellingly, Peters, a lawyer, took title of Lot 6D
with, at a minimum construct! \c, and like!) ./ ,iltui nolio 1 ol (lie I'MI-'I i 'C&Rs im) (lit 1(JK0
I iiii Niifn i /i/. However, Peters has never paid his annual $175 assessment, despite voting
at Association meetings and enjoying the roadway improvements and other benefits provided
by the Association.
• •" ' in ni 'ivmbri i 1 '*^ IVtrp liiliiii i

|H

liliiii ill! mi ni ni ml In I., t h e i ' h I i r n

MOIKT

usa

wrongful lien pursuant to the Summary Procedures of Utah's Wrongful Lien Statute, Utah
Code Ann. §§ 38-9-1, et seq. (R. 0001-14). The Petition sought to invalidate the PMRI

by the district court, Peters ultimately filed an Amended Complaint seeking relief from the
PMRI CC&Rs and the 1980 Lien Notice. As a result, Peters argued, he should not be
require; i^ pay any assessment
siII i

n

hi

In h(c 'HIM llir |i'ii(irs lilnl rnv*" innlioip lor

.. dgment urging the court to resolve these issues as a matter of law. (R. 0184A-85;

0234-35). The district court listened to extensive argument and, in March 2004, issued its
Ruling and Order denying Peters's motion foi summary judgment and graining me
Association's cross motion foi si n i imar> judgment. (R. 0416-20).5 Not satisfied, Peters filed

The court incorporated in its ruling its prior iuling from a c o m p a n i 0 n case
Forest Meadow Ranch Property Owners Association, L.L. C, v. Pine Meadow Ranch Home
Association (also known as Pine Meadow Ranch Home Owners Association and as Pine
Meadow Ranch Association), the appeal of which is also pending in this court, Appellate
Case No. 2004039-CA. (R. 0416-20).
6

a "Second" motion for summary judgment that was also denied by the trial court. (R. 04240425; 0421).
In May 2004, the district court entered judgment in favor of the Association and
against Peters. (R. 0479-83). The judgment ordered, adjudged and decreed (1) that PMRI,
an owner and the subdivider of the land that includes the lot now owned by Peters, properly
encumbered Lot 6D and others in its development with the PMRI CC&Rs; (2) that the
burdens and benefits of the PMRI CC&Rs run with the land and have done so for thirty years
and, as a result, Peters's challenge to the PMRI CC&Rs is untimely; (3) that Peters bought
Lot 6D with notice of the PMRI CC&Rs and acquired title subject to them, and therefore,
it would be inequitable for Peters not to comply with them; and (4) that the PMRI CC&Rs,
the 1980 Lien Notice and the 2003 Clarification of Notice of Lien are not wrongful liens
against Peters's property. (R. 0479-83). Peters now appeals this judgment.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Parties
1.

The Association was established August 14, 1973, by Brent Jensen and

Vincent B. Tolmann to act as the owners' association for the Pine Meadow Subdivisions
located in Summit County, Utah. (R. 0259).
2.

Peters is the beneficial owner of Lot 6D through a 1999 Warranty Deed from

Raymond R. Blanchard recorded by the Summit County Recorder's Office (R. 0215).

7

Chain of Ownership of Lot 6D
3.

Peters's chain of legal title for Lot 6D runs as follows:
a.

Deed from F.E. Bates and Mae P. Bates to Security Title Company,

Trustee, dated October J 4, I H >\ recorded Octobt. .... .*/(;. .^ cnir> numbv i 1111l) LI, 1 took
a;

l

*

.mivl the Inmrrtr i * of property out of which Lot

6D was subsequently created. (R. 0187-88).
b.

(iv. u i

Plat " D " for the Pine Meadow Ranch recorded by Pine Meadow Ranch,

Fhis document was in writing, and was duly signed by all parties, acknowledged

and then recorded. Peters' lot, Lot 6D, was created by the recordation of this Plat by PMRJ.
(R 0188).
c.

Special Warranty Deed to Lot 6D and four other lots from Security Title

Company, Trustee, to Mountainland Properties, Inc., another Jensen entity, dated July 12,
1977,

recorded July 1

- / 7, as entry number 139051, book I'l 19 ; I age ; 2

M l i mi i ni I in ni i l ni ni in I l * i I HI mi 1 in , I n

Ill ill lliiilli

vpivs^h

iiih|i i I I

'V.T.I

monts

(I

0188).
restrictions,

reservations, covenants and rights of way appearing of record and General property taxes."
(R. 0207).
d.

.

iSpccii.iiI VV'iiii iitilh, I V t ill I

Il I "i" I > II1101111 I > I n i i i i l i i i i i L i n i l P i n p i ' i l u . " . . I I H : . ,

to John F. Ryan, a married man, dated August 4, 1980, recorded August 5, 1980, as entry
number 169105, Book Ml 63, page 752. (R. 0188). Ryan also took title expressly subject to

8

"easements, covenants, restrictions, rights of way and reservations appearing of record and
taxes for the year 1980 and thereafter." (R. 0209).
e.

Warranty Deed to Lot 6D John Ryan and Walleen Ryan back to

Mountainland Properties, Inc., dated October 24,1984, recorded October 29,1984, as entry
number 226699, Book 318, page 770. (R. 0188).
f.

Special Warranty Deed to Lot 6D from Mountainland Properties, Inc.,

to Raymond R. Blanchard dba Blanchard Engineering dated October 25, 1984, recorded
March 29, 1985, as entry number 232264, Book 336, page 464. (R. 0188).
g.

Warranty Deed to Lot 6D from Raymond R. Blanchard to Peters dated

January 19,1999, recorded as entrynumber 00528112, Book 01222, page 00335. (R.0188).
Peters took the property by deed expressly subject "to easements, covenants restrictions,
rights of way and reservations appearing of record and, taxes for the year 1999, and each year
thereafter." (R. 0215, emphasis added).
4.

In addition to the limitation in Peters deed, the recordation of the CC&Rs

imports constructive notice of their contents. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-3-102, 574a-2
(2000). The CC&Rs previously recorded by PMRI admittedly appeared of record.
Formation of the Pine Meadow Ranch and Forest Meadow Ranch Subdivisions and
Owners' Associations
5.

Brent Jensen and his various companies, including PMRI, were the developers

of the Pine Meadow and Forest Meadow subdivisions. (R. 0259). Legal title for the land

9

that was later included in those subdivisions was held by Security Title as "trustee," a plainly
declared represented capacity.
6.

<

ah Supreme Court described Brent Jensen and

his interests as the developers of the Pine Meadow and Forest Meadow subdivisions. See
Leo M. Bertanole, Inc., 639 P.2d at 212 (noting that in >
boUglll dLIca^L

:

"Brent Jensen, a defendant,

,

M...

.

"

5

1975,380 mountain lots had been sold in areas served by Tollgate Road, including Jensen's
Forest Meadow Ranch and Pine Meadow Ranch subdivisions").
• 7.

I lie P i n e M t a d o w K a i i L . l i i'lLiill II! I II III. I II >"I

Ill i l

laonlnl

Ill Hie

Recorder on Ma \ < 1976, plainly states that it was recorded by the "owners"
of the property, Jensen's company PMRI and Security Title Company, Trustee. (R. 0204).
8.

i nn

n

was executed by the declared owners, PMRj ,. . w ;„..; Jensen,

Pivsi.*'-P' . ••• '

v• • i

i, •»., s. , ,.

.-,j, -

n .;t* 4 <'' 0204).

Each party's signature on the plat explicitly confirmed the ownership status of the other
party. The signatures were duly acknowledged and the plat was recorded.
9.

I n 11 i i il

I 11 mi i III
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Meadow Ranch" (R. 0204).
The Owners' Declaration of "Plat D" indicates, in relevant part:
"Kn 0W a u m e n "by these presents that
, the
[sic]
undersigned owner ( ) of the above described tract of land,
having caused the same to be subdivided into lots and streets
hereafter to be hereafter known as: PINE MEADOW RANCH,
in

PLAT CD' do hereby dedicate for perpetual use of the public all
parcels of land shown on this plat as intended for public use."
(R. 0204). Then, Plat D is signed by "owners" PMRI and Security Title. While no portion
of the plat appears to have been intended for public (as opposed to community) use, this
Declaration language unambiguously identifies the "owners" of the developed lands. Id.
11.

The Subdivideds Note, also contained on the recorded Plat D, provides, "The

recording of this plat shall not constitute a dedication of roads and streets or rights of way
to public [use]. It is intended that all streets shown hereon shall remain the property of the
subdivider, Pine Meadow Ranch, and shall be completely maintained by said owner." (R.
0204, emphasis added). PMRI was identified as the subdivider of the land as well as the
owner of the land. Id.
12.

The Surveyor's Certificate on Plat D provides that "I, Ralph L. Northrup, do

hereby certify... that I by authority of the Owners, I have made a survey of the tract of land
shown on this plat and described below, and have subdivided said tract of land into lots and
streets, hereafter to be known as Pine Meadow Ranch, Plat 'D. . . .'" (R. 0204, emphasis
added). The surveyor here attested to the land ownership role of PMRI in the subdivision
of the laws.
13.

The Forest Meadow Ranch Landowners Association was initially formed as

the owners' association for the adjacent Forest Meadow subdivisions. (R. 0259).
14.

The Pine Meadow and Forest Meadow subdivisions have always shared a

common water and roadway system and, on May 30, 1978, the Forest Meadow Ranch

11

Landowners Association was merged into the Pine Meadow Association by shareholder vote.
(R. 0259).
15.

Since the merger in 1978, the Association has operated as the homeowners'

association for all of the 800 plus lots, homes and cabins in the Pine Meadow and Forest
Meadow subdivisions. (R. 0259).
16.

The various subdivision plats and the CC&Rs recorded against the properties

within the Association boundaries have been the basis or foundation of hundreds, if not
thousands, of deeds and other conveyances of the 800 lots over the past thirty years. (R.
0260).
17.

Lot ownership has been the basis for membership in the Association, including

assessments and notice of and the right to vote at the Association's annual meetings. (R.
0260).
18.

Prior to the dissolution of the Special Service District for Summit County

referred to below, the Association operated based on funds collected by that District. Since
dissolution of the District, the Association has directly assessed all 800 lots on a uniform
basis to pay for its operations. (R.0260-61).
19.

One of the primary expenses and responsibilities of the Association is to own,

maintain and insure the extensive road system in the Pine Meadow and Forest Meadow
Ranches areas for the benefit of all of the Association's members and their invitees. (R.
0260-61). Access to lots within the Association's boundary, including Lot 6D, can only be
had through the Association's roadway network.
12

20.

The Association also owns, maintains, and insures a substantial amount of open

space for the benefit of its members. (R. 0261).
Creation and Dissolution of the Special Service District
21.

In October 1985, the Summit County Commission determined to establish the

Pine Meadow Special Service District (the "SSD") for the provision of water service, the
maintenance of roadways, and other services in the Pine Meadow areas for the benefit of the
lot and home owners, including the owners of Lot 6D. (R. 0260).
22.

The predecessor owners of Lot 6D paid taxes to and received benefits from the

SSD. (R. 0260).
23.

The SSD was dissolved by vote of the Summit County Commission by

resolution in 1999, and the dissolution was completed. (R. 0260).
24.

The commission, sitting as the governing board for the SSD, conveyed tracts

of open space to the Association and executed a "Deed of Easement" conveying to the
Association, for the benefit and use of its members, an easement for the operation and
maintenance of roads in the Pine Meadow and Forest Meadow subdivisions. (R. 0260-61).
The water rights and delivery system owned by the SSD were conveyed to a separate
company owned by all Association members.
Assessment of the Association's Members Pursuant to the CC&Rs
25.

On September 23,1973, PMRI recorded a set of CC&Rs entitled "Declaration

of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions," dated August 15, 1973, as entry No. 120967,

13

Book No. M50, Pages 521 -530 in the office of the County Recorder of Summit County. (R.
0204).
26.

The PMRI CC&Rs were executed by PMRTs President, W. Brent Jensen. (R.

0221-30). They plainly recite and declare that the CC&Rs are established by PMRI "the
owner of or intends to acquire certain property in Summit County. . . ." (emphasis added).
That acquisition was confirmed by Security Title when it joined with PMRI as "owners" in
executing Plat D.
27.

In furtherance of its activities, the Association has assessed its members for

payment of its actions on their behalf since the dissolution of the SSD. (R. 0261).
28.

The Association has collected from its members, and spent for their benefit

in the Pine Meadow area, hundreds of thousands of dollars. (R. 0261).
29.

In 2003, the Association had an annual budget of approximately $ 140,000. (R.

30.

Should the Association lose its ability to assess all of its members to maintain

0261).

the commonly owned property, maintain its extensive road system and fund its other
activities, its purposes would be frustrated and it would be unable to secure access, maintain
and insure its properties, or enforce its other restrictive covenants on behalf of its members.
(R. 0261).
31.

To confirm public notice of the various sets of CC&Rs recorded against

various Pine Meadow and Forest Meadow subdivisions, the Association republished those
CC&Rs in the form of the 1980 Lien Notice recorded on July 25,1980 as Entry No. 168800
14

in Book 163 at Page 152 of the records of the Summit County Recorder, and therein gave
notice of an address at which confirmation of payments of any assessments could be
obtained. (R. 0261-62).
32.

In response to questions raised in part as a result of this lawsuit, on April 3,

2003, the Association recorded the Clarification of Notice of Lien as Entry No. 653634 in
Book 1523 at Page 1809, confirming that the 1980 Lien Notice was intended merely to
republish the existing CC&Rs and other encumbrances of record and did not create any new
charge or encumbrance on any property. (R. 262).
Procedural History
33.

On December 1, 1999, Peters filed a petition to nullify the 1980 Lien Notice

as a wrongful lien pursuant to the Summary Procedures provided in Utah's Wrongful Lien
Statute, Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-9-1, etseq. (R. 0001-14).
34.

On December 28, 1999, having been denied summary relief, Peters filed a

"Second Petition for Summary Relief to Nullify Wrongful Liens Pursuant to the Utah
Wrongful Lien Statute, U.C.A. Sections 38-9-1 et seq.," seeking an order from the district
court declaring that the 1980 Lien Notice was a "wrongful lien" and a further declaration that
the PMRI CC&Rs were void, thereby excusing Peters from paying any assessments. (R.
0050A-0099).
35.

Having been again denied summary relief, on February 22, 2000, Peters filed

an Amended Complaint seeking to quiet title pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-1. (R.
00157-64).
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36.

On October 17,2003, Peters filed a motion for summary judgment. (R. 0184 A-

37.

On December 5, 2003, the Association filed its cross motion for summary

0185).

judgment and its opposition to Peters's motion for summary judgment. (R. 0234-35).
38.

On March 22,2004, after extensive argument, the district court, the Hon. Judge

Bruce C. Lubeck, District Court Judge, issued its Ruling and Order denying Peters's motion
for summary judgment and granting the Association's cross motion for summary judgment.
(R. 0416-0020).
39.

On April 19,2004, Peters filed a "Second" motion for summary judgment, (R.

0424-25), which was opposed by the Association on May 3, 2004. (R. 0466-73).
40.

On May 5,2004, Judge Lubeck issued his Ruling and Order denying Peters's

Second motion for summary judgment. (R. 0421).
41.

On May 5, 2004, Judge Lubeck thereupon entered judgment that:
1.
Pine Meadow Ranch, Inc., a Utah corporation, an owner
and subdivider of the land that includes the lot owned by
[Peters], properly encumbered that lot [Lot 6D] and others in its
development with the 1973 Declaration of Covenants,
Conditions and Restrictions [the PMRI CC&Rs].
2.
The burdens and benefits of the [PMRI] CC&Rs run with
the land and have done so for the past thirty years. [Peters's]
challenge to the [PMRI] CC&Rs is untimely.
3.
[Peters] bought his lot with notice of the [PMRI] CC&Rs
and acquired his title subject to them. [Peters] enjoys the
benefits of the CC&Rs and it would be inequitable for [Peters]
not to comply with them.
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4.
The [PMRI] CC&Rs, the 1980 [Lien Notice] and the
2003 Clarification of Notice of Lien are not wrongful liens
against [Peters's] property.
5.
Judgment is hereby entered in favor of [the Association]
and against [Peters]. [Peters's] complaint is dismissed, with
prejudice, the parties to bear their own costs and attorney's fees.
(R. 0479-83).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
By the language of his own deed, Peters took title to Lot 6D subject to easements,
restrictions and rights-of-way appearing of record. Peters admits that the PMRI CC&Rs and
the 1980 Lien Notice appeared of record. Therefore, Peters, a lawyer, had notice of them
before he chose to take title. CC&Rs are in essence contracts established by a prior owner
that encumber property for the burden and benefit of the Community, including subsequent
purchasers of particular lots. Peters became a party to this contract at the time he purchased
Lot 6D. As a matter of law, the PMRI CC&Rs cannot be considered adverse to Peters's
interest in Lot 6D since he acquired title expressly subject to them. That limitation appears
on the face of his deed. In addition, invalidating the PMRI CC&Rs would overturn thirty
years of the Association's authority and action on behalf of its members, and the Association
would effectively lose its ability to assess its members to maintain the commonly owned
property, maintain the road and water systems, and fund its other activities. If the CC&Rs
are invalidated, the developer's purpose in establishing a community, and setting up an
association to govern it, would be frustrated.
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Peters ignores both history and practicality, setting up a series of hyper-technical
challenges to these CC&Rs, which were signed, acknowledged and properly recorded, and
have since acquired decades of dignity. He has launched an expensive legal challenge
against the Association in a late effort to avoid its minor, annual assessments. While Peters's
arguments fail as a matter of law, equity also mandates that Peters cannot invalidate the
CC&Rs and reverse thirty years of reliance on them by the Association and hundreds of other
property owners. Pursued to its extreme, Peters's effort to invalidate the PMRI CC&Rs
would elevate serial technical and hypothetical arguments over the compelling and logical
substance of what actually transpired. The result he urges is simply inconsistent with the law
and equity.
Section 57-4a-4(l)(j) of the Utah Code provides a series of clear presumptions,
including a presumption that "recitals and other statements of fact in a [recorded]
document... are true." Utah Code Ann. § 57-4a-4(l)(j) (2003 Supp.).6 The recorded Plats,
CC&Rs and other contemporaneous documents filed in the 1970s declare that PMRI was a
beneficial owner of the property that became Lot 6D at the time the CC&Rs were filed and
recorded. Peters ignores this argument and offered no evidence to overcome the presumption
6

Section 57-4a-4 provides in relevant part: "(1) A recorded document creates
the following presumptions regarding title to the real property affected: . . . 0) recitals and
other statements of fact in a document, including without limitation recitals concerning
mergers or name changes of organizations, are true." Utah Code Ann. § 57-4a-4 (2000). The
provisions of that section also include presumptions that the recorded documents are genuine
and duly executed. The obvious import of these presumptions is to defeat baseless
challenges to the content of recorded documents decades later, after witnesses and documents
are unavailable.
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that these statements are correct. As an owner of the property, PMRI was clearly authorized
to record the PMRI CC&Rs. 7
The doctrine of descriptio personae does not offer Peters any relief or invalidate the
PMRI CC&Rs. This Court has noted that "the unexplained use of the word 'trustee' on a real
property deed does not, absent other circumstances suggest the creation or existence of a
trust, create a trust or implicate only a trust interest." TWN, Inc., v. Michel, 66 P.3d 1031,
1034 (Utah App. 2003) (emphasis added). Thus, a party, like the Association "may resort
to extrinsic evidence to show that a trust was, in fact, intended."

Id.

Unlike the

circumstances of TWN, however, there are here no competing claims of title, and the extrinsic
evidence (including the joinder of Security Title in the creation of Plat D) clearly
demonstrates that Security Title held the property as trustee for the interests then represented
by PMRI.
The PMRI CC&Rs are valid since PMRI was an "owner" of the property at the time
the CC&Rs were filed.

PMRI recorded the CC&Rs declaring itself the owner of the

property. Security Title, which held legal title as trustee, then joined with PMRI in executing
the plat as "owners." It thereby confirmed and ratified of record PMRI's ownership interest.
Any legal requirements of privily were thus satisfied. Peters' s predecessors-in-interest then

7

The illogic of Peters's argument is also demonstrated by the fact that the same
PMRI that recorded the CC&Rs also subdivided the lots and recorded the plat. If it lacked
an interest sufficient to support the CC&Rs, it could not have created Lot 6D. In other
words, if Peters proves that the CC&Rs are invalid, it also proves that Lot 6D was improperly
creates. Peters would then lack standing to challenge the Association.
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received title burdened by the CC&Rs from Security Title, as Trustee for PMRI.8 The
CC&Rs clearly run with the land and Peters took title with notice of the CC&Rs.
Peters also argues the "Utah doctrine of uniformity" but provides no authority for that
proposition. Utah has never adopted it. Peters argues that if the doctrine of uniformity as
described in Am. Jur. 2D applies, the CC&Rs violate this doctrine since they do not apply to
all of the Pine Meadow Ranch property owners. However, Peters misapplies the doctrine.
In fact, their application is completely uniform to all lots the CC&Rs purport to burden.

ARGUMENT
I.

PETERS CANNOT ESCAPE THE 30-YEAR OLD PMRI CC&Rs SINCE HE
TOOK TITLE TO LOT 6D SUBJECT TO, AND WITH NOTICE OF, THE
CC&Rs AND THE 1980 LIEN NOTICE.
Peters5 deed confirms that he took title to Lot 6D "[sjubject to easements, covenants

restrictions, rights of way and reservations appearing of record. . . ." (R. 0215). It also
remains undisputed that the PMRI CC&Rs and 1980 Lien Notice were recorded before
Peters took title to his lot and that he had notice of their content before purchase. Id. In
Utah, the recordation of the CC&Rs imparts constructive notice of their contents. See Utah
Code Ann. §§ 57-3-102, 57-4a-2 (2000). Therefore, both under the terms of his deed and as

8

That Jensen had interests in or later conveyed ownership to other entities which then
acted with Security Title to develop and subdivide Plats E, F, G and I, is not at all
inconsistent with the fact that PMRI had an ownership interest in the lands identified in the
CC&Rs at the time they were recorded. That recital is presumed true and the actions of
Security Title are entirely consistent therewith.
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a matter of law, the CC&Rs cannot be considered adverse to Peters's interest in Lot 6D since
he acquired title expressly subject to the PMRI CC&Rs and 1980 Lien Notice. Moreover,
Peters's conduct, including participating in the affairs of the Association and using its
roadways, confirms an acceptance of and agreement to be bound to the PMRI CC&Rs.
CC&Rs act as a contract established by a prior owner that affects property and are
construed under principles of contract law:
Restrictive covenants that run with the land and encumber
subdivision lots form a contract between subdivision property
owners as a whole and individual lot owners; therefore,
interpretation of the covenants is governed by the same rules of
construction as those used to interpret contracts.
Swenson v. Erickson, 998 P.2d 807, 810-11 (Utah 2000) (citing 20 Am. Jur. 2D Covenants
§ 1 7 0 (1995)) (additional citations omitted) See also Holladay Duplex Management
Company, L.L.C., v. Howells, 47 P.3d 104, 105-106 (Utah App. 2002) (noting deeds and
restrictive covenants are interpreted in the same manner as contracts); Canyon Meadows
Home Owners Association v. Wasatch County, 40 P.3d 1148,1151 (Utah App. 2001) (same).
Therefore, Peters effectively became a party to that contract, i.e., the PMRI CC&Rs, when
he acquired title to Lot 6D subject to the restrictions and covenants recorded at that time as
indicated in the deed. (R. 0215). Therefore, Peters cannot now complain about these CC&Rs
since he took title with actual knowledge of their terms. Id. See 20 Am. Jur. 2D Covenants
§§ 266-67 (1995) ("[Restrictive covenants are enforceable in equity against all those who
take the estate with notice of them") (citations omitted); Swenson, 998 P.2d at 813
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("[rjestrictive

covenant are a common method of effectuating private residential

developmental schemes [and] property owners who purchase land in such developments have
a right to enforce such covenants against other owners who violate them"). Again, as he took
title subject to the CC&Rs, they are not adverse to his title.
It has long been the rule that equitable principles do not allow Peters to avoid
covenants and restrictions of which he had notice at the time of taking title:
Restrictive covenants are enforceable in equity against all
those who take the estate with notice of them, although they
may not be, strictly speaking, real covenants so as to run with
the land or of a nature to create a technical qualification of the
title conveyed by the deed. The question is not whether the
covenant runs with the land, but whether a party will be
permitted to use the land in a manner inconsistent with the
contract entered into by his or her vendor, where the purchase
was made with notice of such covenant. The enforcement of
restrictive covenants or equitable servitudes is based on the
principle of notice; that is, a person taking title to land with
notice of a restriction upon it will not, in equity and good
conscience, be permitted to violate such restriction.
***

Constructive or actual notice of a restrictive covenant imposed
in furtherance of a building or development scheme, on the
part of one against whom enforcement is sought, is essential.
Accordingly, restrictions on the use of land in a subdivision
embraced by a general plan of development can be enforced
against a subsequent purchaser who takes title to the land with
notice of the restriction.
***

A purchaser with notice of restrictive covenants upon land is
bound by such restrictions, although they are not such as in
22

strict legal contemplation run with the land. Thus, even
though a covenant does not run with the land, it may be
enforceable against a transferee of the covenantor who takes
with knowledge of its terms under circumstances which would
make it inequitable to permit avoidance of the restriction.
Such a covenant is binding on a purchaser with notice not
merely because such purchaser stands as an assignee of the
party who made the agreement, but because he or she has
taken the estate with notice of a valid agreement concerning
it. The enforcement against a purchaser with notice rests
upon the principle that it would be inequitable to permit such
an owner, while enjoying the fruits of and claiming under the
grant, part of the consideration for which was the benefit
promised by the covenant, to destroy such benefit by violating
the covenant.
20 Am. Jur. 2D Covenants §§ 266-67 (1995) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Since Peters had notice of the PMRI CC&Rs and the 1980 Lien Notice before he took
title to Lot 6D, he took title subject to these restrictions. 9

Peters cannot now escape

compliance with the PMRI CC&Rs and their republication in the 1980 Lien Notice. Nor
would that result be fair or equitable. As a practical matter, the invalidation of the PMRI
CC&Rs by this newcomer's challenge would effectively cost the Association its ability to
assess its members to maintain the commonly owned property, maintain the road and water

9

The Association does not contest Peters's title to Lot 6D. Nor does the
Association argue that the "subject to" language of the deeds somehow conveyed an interest
to PMRI at the time it recorded the PMRI CC&Rs. There are simply no competing claims
of title herein. Peters took title to his lot recognizing that some other party "may have rights
in the property 'against which the grantor did not warrant title.'" Ault v. Holden, 44 P.3d 781,
792 (Utah 2002) (quoting Johnson v. Peck, 63 P.2d 251, 254 (Utah 1936)). Indeed, "[t]he
words 'subject to'. . . commonly associated with attempts by the grantors to give notice of
encumbrances." Ault at 792 (quoting Hancock v. PlannedDev. Corp., 791 P.2d 183, 186
(Utah 1990)) (emphasis added).
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systems, and fund its other activities (R. 0261). Such a decision would reverse a 30-year

Association. Peters's hyper-technical arguments attacking the CC&Rs represent an expensive
and wasteful effort to exhalt form over substance. The result he seeks is impractical and
unwarranted. It is inconsistent with both law and equity and should be rejected.
II.

PETERS DID NOT OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION THAT PMRI WAS
THE OWNER AND DEVELOPER OF WHAT BECAME LOT 6D AT THE
TIME THE PMRI CC&Rs WERE RECORDED.
Utah law includes a specific statutory presumption, among many, that "recitals and
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recording).
Lot 6D was created by the recorded plat map that established Plat D of the Pine

10

Despite being fully briefed at the district court level, Peters completely ignores
the application of this statutory provision and has marshaled no evidence to attempt to
overcome the presumption.
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Meadow Ranch subdivision. (R. 0188). Plat D, which was recorded with the Summit County
Recorder on May 6, 1976, clearly recites that the "owners" of the property were PMRI and
Security Title. The Owners' Declaration indicates, in relevant part:
Know all men by these presents that
the
[sic]
undersigned owner ( ) of the above described tract of land,
having caused the same to be subdivided into lots and streets
hereafter to be hereafter known as: PINE MEADOW RANCH,
PLAT 'D' do hereby dedicate for perpetual use of the public all
parcels of land shown on this plat as intended for public use.
(R. 0188). The recorded plat was signed by PMRI (by W. Brent Jensen, President, and Zella
J. Jensen, Secretary) and by Security Title Company as Trustee, as owners. (R. 0188).
The Subdivided s Note, also contained on the recorded Plat D, provides additional
evidence that PMRI was the beneficial owner of the property being subdivided. The note
reads:
The recording of this plat shall not constitute a dedication of the
roads and streets or rights of way to public [use]. It is intended
that all streets shown hereon shall remain the property of the
subdivider, Pine Meadow Ranch, and shall be completely
maintained by said owners.
(R. 018 8). The Surveyor's Certificate provides additional evidence and proof that PMRI was
an owner at the time Plat D was recorded. This certification provides, in relevant part, "I,
Ralph L. Northrup, do hereby certify . . . that by authority of the owners, I have made a
survey of the tract of land shown on this plat and described below, and have subdivided the
tract of land into lots & streets, hereinafter to be known as PINE MEADOW RANCH, PLAT
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T) '" (R.0188) (emphasis added). Security Title, as Trustee, by its signature clearly agreed
with and ratified the recital of PMRI's ownership interest.
Peters pi c ' r i : • :!! i i : • ! ^ idei ic> s II: : • i • = 1: i it till i 3 pi esi 11 1 lption

pi irsn lai it il: : s $ ;::1:i ;: 11

57-4a-4(l)(j), that Security Title, held legal title as a "Trustee" on behalf of its now-identified
principal. Plat D and the PMRI CC&Rs themselves confirm that the principal, the beneficial
titl = 1 1 : 1 dei , as of tl le tii 1 le c >f 1 ecoi datioi 1 w as I >MR I, tl lepai ty that signed and recorded the
PMRI CC&Rs. (R. 0221-30). Utah Law is clear to the effect that:
There is a significant difference between the type of bare legal
title possessed by an agent or trustee and the beneficial
interest
Agents and trustees have no direct beneficial
interest in the property to which they hold title. Their title is
held purely for the benefit of another.
Capital Assets Financial Services v. Maxwell, 994 P.2d 201, 205 (Utah 2000).11
The PMRI CC&Rs also recite that PMRI was the owner of "the South one-half of

of Section 20; All of Section 21; all in Township 1 North, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and

Peters also argues that the PMRI CC&Rs are invalid under the Utah general
law of trusts as "the beneficiary of a trust does not have the power to encumber specific
properties held by the trustee in trust." App. Br. 39-43. Peters offers no legal authority from
Utah to support his argument and ignores the law illustrated in Capital Assets, supra.
Whatever person or entity held beneficial title when the property was deeded to Security Title
as trustee in 1965, Security Title's own filings confirm that the beneficial ownership of the
property was held by PMRI at the time CC&Rs and Plat D were recorded. Clearly, Security
Title "purely" held title "for the benefit of another." 944 P.2d at 205. Peters's litany of
hypotheticals, App. Br. at 39-43, ignores the reality that PMRI was the property owner and
Security Title acted as trustee in holding the title for PMRI. None of the "parade of
horribles" suggested by Peters results from the determination that PMRI, as an owner of the
property, had the authority to record the CC&Rs or that the CC&Rs remain valid today.

Meridian (containing approximately 1,200 acres)/' (R. 0221), a portion of which ultimately
became Lot 6D. The PMRI CC&Rs were signed by W. Brent Jensen, as President of PMRI.
Id. By statutory presumption, this statement in the recorded PMRI CC&Rs establishes that
PMRI had an ownership interest in the property at the time the PMRI CC&Rs were recorded.
See Utah Code Ann. § 57-4a-4(l)(j) (2000). No contrary evidence of any kind was offered,
let alone "clear and convincing" evidence.
Yet additional evidence supports that fact that PMRI was the beneficial owner of the
property at the time the CC&Rs were recorded. It has long been common knowledge and
reputation in the Pine Meadow area that Brent Jensen and his companies, including PMRI,
were the developers of Pine Meadow and Forest Meadow subdivisions. (R. 0259). The Utah
Supreme Court described their involvement as the developers of the Pine Meadow and Forest
Meadow subdivisions. See Leo M. Bertanole, Inc., 639 P.2d at 212 (noting that in 1970
"Brent Jensen, a defendant, bought acreage north of Tollgate Canyon for development
purposes. . . . By January 1, 1975, 380 mountain lots had been sold in areas served by
Tollgate Road, including Jensen's Forest Meadow Ranch and Pine Meadow Ranch
subdivisions"). Though the interest of PMRI in the property may not have appeared of
record before the filing of the PMRI CC&Rs and Plat D, the world was clearly put on notice
thereof when those documents were recorded. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-3-102, 57-4a-2
(2000). Indeed, all who acquired or now own lots created by PMRI's Plat D took title to
those lots by virtue of PMRI's actions as owner and subdivider.
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There is simply no evidence to overcome the presumption that the beneficial owner

was PMRI. All logical indications and practical considerations confirm that it was, and acted
as, an owner of the property. Accordingly, as owner, PMRI had full authority to burden its
lands and record the PMRI CC&Rs to create constructive notice of their content.
A.

Peters' Assertion that Security I ltle Owned the Property that B e c a m e Lot 6D
Outright Under the Doctrine of Descriptio Personae is Incorrect Because
"Other Circumstances Suggesting the Creation or Existence o f a Trust" are
Present.

Peters incorrectly asserts that the term "trustee" in the original Bates' deed to Security
' I itle (R 0202) , wasi i lerely descriptio / lei 'som le " and thei efoi e insufficient to for m a t i i iston
behalf o f Deseret Diversified. App. Br. at 22-28. Therefore, Peters's argument follows,
since no trust existed, PMRI did not have the authority necessary to record the PMRI CC&Rs
act i lal o wi lei

pi opei t)

I :: tl )• z : : c i lti ait 3 , " 'agents and

trustees have no direct beneficial interest in the property to which they hold title." Capital
Assets, 994P.2dat205.
Peters asserts tl lat tl lis c ase is sii nilai It : • 1 'W 7 \ ] i r < • v 1 4 ichel , 66 I " 3d 1031 ( ( Jtah
App. 2003). See App. Br. at 26. In TWN, the parties asserted competing claims to ownership
o f a parcel that was passed to one party's predecessor in interest by "Richard A. Christenson,
Trustee" and the other parcel passed to the other party's predecessor in interest by "Richard
A . Christenson." Id. at 1032. The issi ic ii 1 7 Tf TV w as vv 1 1 *tl iiei a gi ai itoi *"s 1 me:? :plained
placing of the word "trustee" next to his name on a real property deed results, as a matter o f
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law, in conveyance of only a trust interest. The court noted that the doctrine of descriptio
personae applied when "certain terms [are] sometimes added to a person's name [that] are
merely descriptive matter intended to clarify the identity of the person, but their use or nonuse should generally play no part in the validity of the conveyance." Id, at 1033. The
concept of descriptio personae "has long been recognized" to apply "to the identification of
parties on real property deeds. Id. at 1034 (citations omitted). Therefore, the court held,
"[t]he unexplained use of the word 'trustee' on a real property deed does not, absent other
circumstances suggesting the creation or existence of a trust, create a trust or implicate only
a trust interest." Id (emphasis added). The court also noted that Utah Code Ann. §
75-7-402(5) authorizes a trustee to dispose of trust property "in the name of the trust as
trustee." TWNvX 1035 (citing U.C.A. § 75-7-402(5) (1993)). Typically, the court noted, "[a]
trustee grantor should include on the deed such language as 'in my capacity as trustee for the
XYZ trust' [but] a party may resort to extrinsic evidence to show that a trust was, in fact,
intended." Id. (emphasis added).
The overwhelming extrinsic evidence here shows that the beneficial owner of the
property at the time of development was PMRI, and that Security Title acted as trustee for
the owner. It is undisputed that Peters's title traces back to Security Title and it is undisputed
that Security Title's name is on the deed in its capacity as trustee. (R. 0202). Unlike the
inconsistent designation of an individual in competing title documents in TWN, Security Title
is a company that customarily acts as a trustee in real property transactions. Its name,
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Security Title, was one that would generally be seen as a trustee, not a property owner.
Furthermore, the recorded Plat D reflected P M R l as the owner of the property and Security

and P M R l as owners of the property. Id. Moreover, it is undisputed that PMRl had recorded
the C C & R s declaring that it was owner of the land. (R. 0221-30).
Seem it;; I 'itl = tl iei c aftei con > - c ;; s titl :: I : Its bit n dei i€ d b> 1:1 le CC&R s

I he word

"trustee" under the circumstances surrounding this case clearly reflected both the existence
of trust arrangements and that PMRl was the beneficiary and owner of the property at the
time the C C & R s and Plat were recorded. The word "trustee" as used in these instruments
was not superfluous, nor did it vest fee i il It MI Stvurily Title • IIIKT if spccif'mnlh d r s n K'd
and limited the interest held by that entity. See, Neeley v. Intercity Mgmt. Corp., 623 S. W.2d
942, 948 (Tex.App. 1981) (cited in TWN and holding that a trust was created where there

deed). Here, the doctrine of descriptiopersonae,
B.

as argued by Peters, is inapplicable.

The P M R l CC&Rs are Valid Since P M R l was an Owner of the Property that
Became Lot 6D.

Peters incoi i ec tl/; ait gi les that I ^ t l I :• : i ill, :1 it I : it 1 la • = i: ecoi ded the I fh IE! I CC&R s
because it had no estate in the property that became Lot 6D since Security Title owned the
land in fee simple. See App. Br. at 30. Security Title did not acquire title in fee simple, and
1hrir i l i n n idiMHV (osugjn >t o t h r i " IH l n d i v d , N r n i i i h 'I ill' i K linn confirm 111 il I'l' II' [

was in privity of estate and entitled to record CC&Rs relating to what would become Lot 6D.
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Restrictive covenants, like the PMRI CC&Rs, that run with the land must have the
following characteristics: "(1) the covenant must touch and concern the land; (2) the
covenanting parties must intend the covenant to run with the land; and (3) there must be
privity of estate." Flying Diamond Oil Corporation v. Newton Sheep Company, 776 P.2d
618,622-23 (Utah 1989).
The first requirement requires that it "touch and concern the land." "For a covenant
to run in equity, it must 'touch and concern' the land, and there must be an intent that it run.
Privity is not required, but the successor must have notice of the covenant." Id. at 623, n. 6.
The Flying Diamond further court notes:
Not every covenant binds subsequent owners or users of the
land, even though the covenant purports to be a covenant that
runs with the land. The effect of the touch-and-concern
requirement is to restrict the types of duties and liabilities that
can burden future ownership of interests in the land. The touchand-concern requirement focuses on the nature of the burdens
and benefits that a covenant creates. What is essential is that the
burdens and benefits created must relate to the land and the
ownership of an interest in it; the burdens and benefits created
are not the personal duties or rights of the parties to a covenant
that exist independently from the ownership of an interest in the
land (citations omitted).
***

[T]o touch and concern the land, a covenant must bear upon the
use and enjoyment of the land and be of the kind that the owner
of an estate or interest in land may make because of ownership
right.
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Id. at 623-24 (citations omitted). The second characteristic requires that the parties intended
the covenant to run with the land. The parities' intent may be determined by an express
statement in the document or implied by the nature of the covenant itself. Id. at Ul L The
PMRI CC&Rs expressly meet these

rirements.

The final characteristic is that of privity of estate.

"Privity of estate requires a

particular kind of relationship between the original covenantor and the covenantee." Id. at
h?K |i ikitNiii: Hiiiill Ill

1 I \v \\w llmv type . n( pin ily w\ m j i i l r

'.

.

.

(1) mutual, i.e., a covenant arising from simultaneous interest in
the same land; (2) horizontal, i.e., a covenant created in
connection with a conveyance of an estate from one of the
parties to another; and (3) vertical, i.e., the devolution of an
estate burdened or benefitted by a covenant from an original
covenanting party to a successor.
; * ^c

*

Mutual privity exists when the parties have a continuing and
simultaneous interest in the same property (citations omitted).
Horizontal privity exists when the original covenanting parties
create a covenant in connection with a simultaneous conveyance
of an estate (citations omitted). Vertical privity arises when the
person presently claiming the benefit, or being subjected to the
burden is a successor to the estate of the original person so
benefitted or burdened. Vertical privity exists in all covenant
situations except where a successor to the burdened or
benefitted land is an adverse possessor or a disseisor.
Id. (citations omitted). Flying Diamond declares that the "strict approacl I tc • pi ivitj doctrine
[should be abandoned] and

substance should prevail over technical form so that a

homeowner's association which had no interest in the property at all could sue to enforce a
covenant " i1' \ / at 628, i I. 13 (citatioi is oi i lifted).
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When the substance of this case is examined, it clearly appears that there was vertical
privity of estate: here Security Title acquired legal title as Trustee for the interests that were
ultimately held by PMRI. (R. 0202). Security Title, a business that by statute and function
held and transferred land titles, acquired this property in the stated capacity of trustee for
then-undisclosed interests. The beneficial interest of PMRI was then reflected of record when
it recorded the PMRI CC&Rs reciting its ownership of the property that subsequently became
Lot 6D. (R. 0221-30). Security Title ratified and confirmed that interest when it executed the
Plat D jointly with PMRI as "owners." Peter's predecessors-in-interest then received title
from Security Title as Trustee for PMRI. (R. 0204).
The PMRI CC&Rs expressly state that:
Declarant [PMRI] hereby declares that all of the properties
described above shall be held, sold and conveyed subject to the
following easements, restrictions, covenants, and conditions,
which are for the purpose of protecting the value and desirability
of, and which shall run with, the real property and be binding
on all parties having any part thereof, their heirs, successors and
assigns, and shall inure to the benefit of each owner thereof.
(R. 0221) (emphasis added). Under Flying Diamond, the CC&Rs clearly run with the land
and Peters is bound by them. The chain of title is clear, and as the trial court ruled in its
March 22, 2004, Ruling and Order, "the CCRs are restrictive covenants that run with the
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land..." and [Peters] "had notice of such contractually agreed upon restrictions and therefore,
[Peters] is bound by that contract and the restrictions contained therein." (R. 0215).12
Additioi iall} ii 101 cic: i foi Petei st : pi : > ail • : 1:11 lis argument tl latl rt\ 1RI lacks the privity
requisite to record the PMRI CC&Rs, PMRI must overcome the statutory presumption of
ownership created by the content of these documents by clear and convincing evidence. See
Jacobs, 87: • ....*.;
by cleai

.

(noting "the presumption [in section 57-4a-4] may only be overcome
:

< vidence"). Here, Peters I las 1 lot 1 .tten lpted to pi 01 i :k: ait 1;; si ich

evidence. 1 3

12

The trial court held, "even if they are not restrictive covenants that run with the
land, they are restrictions that were contractually agreed upon [by] [Peters's] predecessors
in interest. . . ." (R. 0419). Peters argues that the "trial court was mistaken" because "the
agreement would be unenforceable under the Utah Statute of Frauds and void under the Utah
Recording Act." App. Br. 45. This proposition is wholly unsupported by Peters. Peters cites
no legal authority for his position and Peters conveniently ignores the fact that the CC&Rs
were properly recorded and that Peters had notice of their content. PMRI was clearly the
developer of the Pine Meadow and Forest Meadow areas. In Utah, a party must prevail in
claims on the strength of his own title and not on the weakness of another. See, e.g., Kelly
v. Hard Money Funding, Inc., 87 P.3d 734, 790 (Utah App. 2004) (noting rule that "to
succeed in an action to quiet title to real estate, a plaintiff must prevail on the strength of his
own claim to title and not on the weakness of a defendant's title or even its total lack of
title"); Collard v. Nagle Const, Inc., 57 P.3d 603, 607 (Utah App. 2002) (same); Church v.
Meadow Springs Ranch Corporation, Inc., 659 P.2d 1045, 1048-49 (Utah 1983) (same).
Peters's argument is not based on the strength of his own claim, but rather on unsupported
and nonsensical arguments about the way the land was subdivided.
13

Peters suggests that Dunlap v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 76 P.3d
711 (Utah App. 2003), cert, den., 84 P.3d 239 (Utah 2004), is supportive of his position. See
App. Br. at 36-38. Peters's reliance on Dunlap is misplaced. The issue in Dunlap involved
determining ownership between completing chains of title. Here, there is no dispute as to
title regarding Lot 6D. The Association does not claim to be the owner of Lot 6D through
a competing chain of title nor does it contest that Peters is the rightful owner Dunlap and
34

III.

UTAH HAS NOT ADOPTED THE DOCTRINE OF UNIFORMITY AND IT IS
UNNECESSARY TO DO SO AS THE CC&Rs ARE UNIFORM IN THE
RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED.
Peters argues that the PMRI CC&Rs are unenforceable under the "Utah Doctrine of

Uniformity" since they cover only a minority of the lots in the Pine Meadow Ranch area. See
App. Br. at 43-44.
Peters cites no authority at all for his argument that the Utah legislature or courts have
adopted the doctrine of uniformity. They have not. Moreover, even assuming that the
doctrine of uniformity applies, the CC&Rs are uniform as applied to each lot or home owner
burdened by them. Specifically, the PMRI CC&Rs state: "[b]oth annual and special
assessments must be fixed at a uniform rate for services provided for all Lots

" (R. 0026).

Peters complains that the PMRI CC&Rs do not apply to all of the land owners in the Pine
Meadow Ranch area, specifically to Plats E, F, G, I and the other "unplatted land." App. Br.
43-44. There is no requirement that they do so. Under the doctrine of uniformity, even as
described by Peters, the CC&Rs must only be uniform in their application to those land
owners to whom the CC&Rs apply. See 20 Am. Jur. 2D Covenants § 160 (1995) ("Restrictive
covenants in deed will not be enforced at the instance of other property owners unless there
is reasonable uniformity in the restrictions imposed. . . .") (emphasis). That requirement is

similar cases focus on the problems created when documents affecting title are not recorded.
Dunlap does not support the position that the content of a recorded document such as
CC&Rs, recorded may be ignored, especially when the party has notice of the recorded
document and its content. Peters's argument that Dunlap some how implicates the Utah's
Statute of Frauds is unfounded as well.
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met 1 lei e: the resti ictioi is in :i tl le I rh 4 R I C C & P s appl) ' i 11rifoiit i it; to all lai ids that are si!
to them.
On a broader scale, the uncontroverted evidence before the trial court shows that the
Associatioi i s assessmei its at e, ii i fact, i in lifoi it it 1 t l n c 1 l g l i nm it 1:1 I z ><, at ioi is I ''it le 1"\ leadow ai id
Forest Meadow Subdivisions. Peter's lot is admittedly burdened by the CC&Rs, and he m a y
not escape his obligations thereunder by arguing that others are not. This technical argument
also fails.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated in this Brief, the Judgment entered by the Court on behalf of the
Association is amply supported in law and in equity. This Court should, therefore, reject
Peters's tecl n it. ::al ai gi n i letits at id affix i i I the Disti let Coi n t's ji ldgi nei it.
Respectfully submitted t h i s ^ T ' day of October 2004.
C L Y D E S N O W SESSIONS & S W E N S O N

Edwin C. Barnes
Walter A. Romney, Jr.
Attorneys for Respondent /Appellee
Pine Meadow Ranch Home Owners A ssoc iatioi i
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ADDENDUM

Westlaw
UT ST § 57-3-102
U.C.A. 1953 § 57-3-102

Page 1

UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 57. REAL ESTATE
CHAPTER 3. RECORDING OF DOCUMENTS
PART 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS
Copyright

@

1953-2000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS
Publishing companies. All rights reserved.

57-3-102 Record imparts notice --Change in interest rate --Validity of document --Notice
of unnamed interests --Conveyance by grantee [Effective until July 1, 2001].
(1) Each document executed, acknowledged, and certified, in the manner prescribed by
this title, each original document or certified copy of a document complying with Section
57-4a-3, whether or not acknowledged, each copy of a notice of location complying with
Section 40-1-4, and each financing statement complying with Section 70A-9-402, whether or
not acknowledged shall, from the time of recording with the appropriate county recorder,
impart notice to all persons of their contents.
(2) If a recorded document was given as security, a change in the interest rate in
accordance with the terms of an agreement pertaining to the underlying secured obligation
does not affect the notice or alter the priority of the document provided under Subsection
(1) .
(3) This section does not affect the validity of a document with respect to the parties
to the document and all other persons who have notice of the document.
(4) The fact that a recorded document recites only a nominal consideration, names the
grantee as trustee, or otherwise purports to be in trust without naming beneficiaries or
stating the terms of the trust does not charge any third person with notice of any
interest of the grantor or of the interest of any other person not named in the document.
(5) The grantee in a recorded document may convey the interest granted to him free and
clear of all claims not disclosed in the document in which he appears as grantee or in any
other document recorded in accordance with this title that sets forth the names of the
beneficiaries, specifies the interest claimed, and describes the real property subject to
the interest.
U.C.A. 1953 § 57-3-102
UT ST § 57-3-102
END OF DOCUMENT

Copr. ® 2004 West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

W?stlaw
UT ST § 5 7 - 4 a - 2
U.C.A. 1953 § 5 7 - 4 a - 2
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UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 57. REAL ESTATE
CHAPTER 4a. EFFECTS OF RECORDING
Copyright ® 1953-2 000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS
Publishing companies. All rights reserved.
57-4a-2

Recorded document imparts notice of contents despite defects.

A recorded document imparts notice of its contents regardless of any defect,
irregularity, or omission in its execution, attestation, or acknowledgment. A certified
copy of a recorded document is admissible as evidence to the same extent the original
document would be admissible as evidence.
History: C. 1953, 57-4a-2, enacted by L. 1988, ch. 155, § 20.
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Effect on existing documents.
When this section took effect on July 1, 1988, it operated to cure any existing
defective recorded document. First Sec. Bank v. Styler, 147 Bankr. 248 (D. Utah 1992).
This section does not say that a defective document is valid only if recorded after July
1, 1988. First Sec. Bank v. Styler, 147 Bankr. 248 (D. Utah 1992).
Section 68-3-3, prohibiting retroactive effect unless expressly declared, has no
application to the operation of this section. This section cured existing defective
recorded documents when it took effect; it did not retroactively cure any defective
instruments. First Sec. Bank v. Styler, 147 Bankr. 248 (D. Utah 1992).
U.C.A. 1953 § 57-4a-2
UT ST § 57-4a-2
END OF DOCUMENT

Copr. ® 2004 West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 57. REAL ESTATE
CHAPTER 4a. EFFECTS OF RECORDING
Copyright

@

1953-2000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS
Publishing companies. All rights reserved.

57-4a-4

Presumptions.

(1) A recorded document creates the following presumptions regarding title to the real
property affected:
(a) the document is genuine and was executed voluntarily by the person purporting to
execute it;
(b) the person executing the document and the person
are the persons they purport to be;

!<..*• J »-li ill it is executed

(c) the person executing the document was neither incompetent nor a minor at any
relevant time;
(d) delivery occurred notwithstanding any lapse of time between dates on the document
and the date of recording;
(e) any necessary consideration was given;
(f) the grantee, transferee, or beneficiary of an interest created or described by the
document acted in good faith at all relevant times;
(g) a person executing a document as an agent, attorney in fact, officer of an
organization, or in a fiduciary or official capacity:
(i) held the position he purported to hold and acted within the scope of his authority;
(ii) in the case of an officer of an organization, was authorized under all applicable
laws to act on behalf of the organization; and
(iii) in the case of an agent, his agency was not revoked, and he acted for a principal
who was neither incompetent nor a minor at any relevant time;
(h) a person executing the document as an individual:
(i) was unmarried on the effective date of the document; or
(ii) if it otherwise appears from the document that the person was married on the
effective date of the document, the grantee was a bona fide purchaser and the grantor
received adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth so that the joinder of

Copr. ® 2 004 West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

V\festlaw
UT ST § 57-4a-4
U.C.A. 1953 § 57-4a-4

Page 2

the nonexecuting spouse was not required under Sections 75-2-201 through 75-2-207;
(i) if the document purports to be executed pursuant to or to be a final determination
in a judicial or administrative proceeding, or to be executed pursuant to a power of
eminent domain, the court, official body, or condemnor acted within its jurisdiction and
all steps required for the execution of the document were taken; and
(j) recitals and other statements of fact in a document, including without limitation
recitals concerning mergers or name changes of organizations, are true.
(2) The presumptions stated in Subsection (1) arise even though the document purports
only to release a claim or to convey any right, title, or interest of the person executing
it or the person on whose behalf it is executed.
History: C. 1953, 57-4a-4, enacted by L. 1988, ch. 155, § 22; 1989, ch. 88, § 11.
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Evidence to overcome presumption.
Cited.
Evidence to overcome presumption.
The presumption of valid delivery when a deed has been executed and recorded may be
overcome only by clear and convincing evidence that the deed was in fact not delivered.
Jacobs v. Hafen, 875 P.2d 559 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Cited in Reinbold v. Utah Fun Shares, 850 P.2d 487 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
U.C.A. 1953 § 57-4a-4
UT ST § 57-4a-4
END OF DOCUMENT

Copr. ® 2004 West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

